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INTRODUCTION 
P u b l i c  a c t o r s  ( p o l i c y- m a k e r s  o r  e l e c t e d 
representatives), scientists and manufacturers are 
frequently confronted with resistance from public 
opinion, in the course of their activities or their 
attempts to innovate. Examples abound — from 
nanotechnology to GMOs to fracking, not to 
mention almost any kind of “reform” — of the 
diffi  culty of convincing or reassuring a public that 
is fearful of many dangers, real or imagined.
In general ,  publ ic  opinion adhere s  to the 
precautionar y pr incip le ,  characte r ize d by 
re sistance to innovation and to economic 
development. Consequently, the social and 
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  a c c e p t a b i l i t y  o f  p r o j e c t s 
— particularly major projects — has diminished. 
This has resulted in deadlock for a wide range of 
projects, where the gap between public opinion 
and that of experts or institutional actors can 
seemingly not be bridged.
This gap stems in large part from changing 
attitudes to danger; perceptions of danger have 
evolved, bringing with them new attitudes and 
beliefs. By taking account of these changes, 
we can develop a new analytical framework 
for understanding deadlock situations and the 
diff erent perspectives at play, and — in the case of 
projects involving issues of social or environmental 
acceptability — new methodological tools for 
planning ahead and for designing communication 
strategies. 
Nanotechnologies, GMOs, fracking, 
radioactivity… Modern societies are 
characterized by both the proliferation 
of risks and an increasing diffi culty in 
assuaging public opinion. This article 
analyzes how perceptions of danger have 
evolved and identifi es key questions when 
it comes to social acceptability of projects. 
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1. A PROFOUND CHANGE IN ATTITUDES 
TO DANGER
1.1 DANGER, RISK, THREAT
To understand the diminishing public acceptance of risk, we made the 
assumption that our relationship to danger has changed, and with it 
the capacity to cope with or manage uncertainty.
To test this hypothesis, we developed a model that distinguishes between 
two different approaches to the management of danger.
The fi rst is the historical scientifi c construction based on risk analysis, 
i.e. calculating the probabilities and comparing the costs and benefi ts of 
any given event. In this framework — which we call the “regime of risk” —
risk can be calculated and quantifi ed rationally. Given the probability of 
an event occurring, and the expected outcomes, one can make a fully 
“informed” decision. Uncertainty does not disappear, but it is to some 
extent circumscribed and can be managed rationally.
Our hypothesis is that this risk-based model of danger management, on 
which science and progress in the west depend, has been brought into 
question by public opinion. For multiple reasons, trust in this model has 
been eroded. Consequently, the scientifi c construction of our relationship 
to danger is no longer seen as offering security or reassurance, and is no 
longer suffi cient to convince public opinion to “take the risk”. When public 
opinion loses faith in the fundamentals of this construction, the public is 
no longer able to adhere to the model, and can no longer adopt a rational 
position on the questions asked. As a result, the impression of danger 
is increased.
But danger has not gone away; we must therefore reconstruct our 
relationship to it. As the regime of risk is no longer operative, public 
opinion has, de facto, developed a new way of experiencing its 
relationship to danger, organized around what we have termed a “regime 
of threat”. Where the regime of risk deals with uncertainty by means 
of rational calculation, the regime of threat operates through a quite 
different register, in which the relationship to uncertainty can no longer 
be rationalized. The threat is not something that is calculated, and it is no 
longer possible to make an enlightened decision. As a result, risk-based 
danger management is destabilized by this new approach based on the 
notion of threat.
The difference between risk and threat is central to our core hypothesis. It 
is the key to understanding the divergences between institutional actors 
and experts on the one hand and public opinion on the other. While the 
risk model enables rational decisions and “risk-taking”, the regime of 
threat creates an inability to make rational decisions and to manage 
uncertainty. There is no such thing as “threat-taking”: one can only “live 
under threat”.
The change in our relationship to danger is summed up in the grammatical 
difference between risk — which we can take, as agents — and threat, 
which we can only endure as objects.
This change in public attitudes to danger is at the heart of the declining 
acceptance of industrial activity and innovation. It goes a long way toward 
explaining why it is impossible to understand each other: the arguments 
of the experts continue to be based on the risk model while public 
perceptions are based on the threat model. The public and the experts 
are not speaking the same language, and the arguments of the experts 
are falling on deaf ears.
1.2 THE REASONS FOR THE CHANGE 
IN ATTITUDES TO DANGER 
The reasons for this change in public attitudes to 
danger are numerous: they are structured around 
an extraordinarily fierce distrust that has historical, 
scientifi c and social causes.
The crisis of trust af fects many fields (political, 
social, economical, etc.), and one of the main ways 
in which it is manifested concerns the management 
of danger. When public opinion is marked by distrust 
(of politicians, experts, forecasting and calculation 
systems, etc.), and even by suspicion about the 
underlying motivations of everyone involved, it is hard 
for the public to buy in to the risk management model 
advocated by institutional actors and experts.
The depth of distrust about the relationship to danger 
is clearly an aspect of today’s general climate of 
distrust, but it also has its own specifi c construction, 
with its own dynamics.
1.2.1 The consequences of past crises
The fi rst factor in the questioning of the regime of risk 
is that of past crises. Events such as the explosion 
of the reactor at Chernobyl, the contaminated blood 
scandals, or “mad cow” disease have left deep marks 
on public opinion. The fact that these crises happened 
showed that there were shortcomings in our ability 
to anticipate risks. They created serious doubts 
about the risk management system and its ability to 
calculate and prevent danger effectively.
Dramatic events (recurrent or non-recurrent) are 
generally reinterpreted in the light of what could, or 
should, have been done to prevent them, but wasn’t. 
These crises have given root to the idea that the 
exposure to risk resulted from choices or decisions 
in which financial objectives took precedence over 
safety goals. For public opinion, the lasting impression 
is also that decisions were made without due regard 
for safety considerations.
These various crises of the 1990s contributed, in 
their way, to the broader crisis of trust in government, 
experts, the scientific community, and institutions 
in general. 
“WHERE THE REGIME OF RISK DEALS 
WITH UNCERTAINTY BY MEANS OF 
RATIONAL CALCULATION, THE REGIME 
OF THREAT OPERATES THROUGH A 
QUITE DIFFERENT REGISTER, IN WHICH 
THE RELATIONSHIP TO UNCERTAINTY 
CAN NO LONGER BE RATIONALIZED .”




1.2.2 The emergence of new dangers
The second factor in the emergence of a relationship 
to danger governed by a logic of threat is the arrival 
of new dangers. The risk system works perfectly with 
a single, identifiable event of which the probability 
c an be c alculated and which,  when i t  o ccurs, 
produces direct, measurable consequences. This, 
fundamentally,  is the mode of calculation and 
prevention of industrial accidents.
For public opinion, the new risks do not share these 
attributes: their source is not clearly identified, 
they are invisible and impalpable; it is possible to be 
exposed to them passively and completely unawares; 
the effects they are liable to produce only emerge 
over the long term, and their consequences are linked 
to a complex chain of causes and effects which are 
diffi cult to distinguish. In the past, the asbestos crisis 
demonstrated that dramatic consequences can 
appear and be recognized very late in the day. The 
dioxin crisis has also created an acute sensitivity to 
these risks, which emerge only slowly and diffusely.
Some of these “new” dangers are seen as having 
proper t ies that exclude th em from th e scope 
o f  c o n v e n t i o n a l  r i s k  a n a l y s i s :  r a d i o a c t i v i t y, 
electromagnetic waves, GMOs, nanotechnologies. 
Given their characteristics, the uncertainty they 
arouse is matched by their invisibility, making it hard 
to apply the risk model, and hard for public opinion 
to subscribe to it. Additionally, the effects ascribed 
to these new risks coincide with public perceptions 
of cancer, in the widest sense, cr ystallizing the 
associated fears.
1.2.3 The inability to settle scientifi c controversies
The third factor in the switch from the risk model 
to the threat model is the new status of scientific 
controversy. Of course, controversies have always 
existed and have been instrumental, throughout 
history, in the forward march of progress. But the 
condition for a controversy to culminate in progress 
has always been the ability of recognized authorities 
to arbitrate, settle and conclude these controversies. 
Around this conclusion, a consensus could form, 
making the theory of one of the parties the new basis 
from which to move forward again.
But controversies can no longer be set tled as 
they were historically. This situation is due to two 
phenomena. On the one hand, the crisis of trust in 
authority abolishes the notion of a reference authority 
and, with it, the ability of the authorities to settle 
controversies. On the other, the public is troubled by 
a twofold proliferation: that of scientifi c studies from 
a wide range of sources, which makes it difficult for 
the layman to establish a hierarchy between them, 
and that of the media, which facilitates access to 
these studies. The proliferation of traditional and 
online media makes it possible for anyone with the 
right tactical approach to reach a wide audience, 
independently of the institutional authority of the 
author (paradoxically, even more effectively, precisely because there is 
no apparent authority). The Internet facilitates the endless proliferation 
of controversies and the traces that remain will sow further doubt for 
the future, regardless of any groundswell movement that eventually 
succeeds, succeed, de facto, in overcoming the controversy.
1.2.4 The functioning of the media
Independently of the media’s role in propagating controversies, the 
way in which the media operate also contributes to the inability of 
public opinion to cope with uncertainty. This phenomenon stems 
from two characteristics of the media’s handling of information, which 
obey the economics of broadcasting. The first is the importance of 
revelation, which takes precedence over the actual facts; the second is 
the well-known media adage that good news is no news. This mode of 
functioning—driven by viewer, listener or reader numbers—focuses the 
media spotlight on scares and on alarmist voices.
The actual form of the information produced by the media also tends to 
exacerbate the alarmist nature of the messages it carries, as the format 
makes it diffi cult to express nuance or complexity. Whereas most new 
risks are highly complex phenomena, their media treatment simplifi es 
them, ultimately focusing only the perception of the potential threats 
associated with them. 
1.3 HOW DOES PUBLIC OPINION ADAPT TO LIVING UNDER THREAT?
There are many reasons why the public has come to distrust the risk-
based system on which our relationship to danger was constructed. This 
is not to say that it is either pleasant or comfortable to have a relationship 
to danger built on a “grammar of threat”. What are its main rules and 
characteristics?
The grammar of threat is primarily organized around the idea that it is 
impossible to prove an absence of danger. Such a proof is scientifi cally 
impossible, and this impossibility reinforces the idea that there is indeed 
a danger. Under this regime, the harder one tries to offer reassurance, the 
more one provokes doubt, through a paradoxical phenomenon: if it takes 
so much effort to prove something, then there really must be a problem! 




The second parameter of the grammar of threat is the belief that there 
is no certain knowledge on which one can depend in the long term. 
This dynamic of questioning former certainties is nothing other than 
the dynamic of progress, in which the next step often contradicts or 
invalidates the previous state of knowledge. For public opinion, marked 
by the experience of crises that showed just how badly the dangers 
had been underestimated, this reasoning, when applied to risks, makes 
reassurance impossible. It echoes a more general distrust of progress, 
of which the benefi ts are no longer assessed against the risks—under the 
standard “regime of risk” model—but where every danger, identifi ed or 
potential, generates a fear that can grow into hostility toward any given 
innovation or activity.
The fi nal parameter is the pervasiveness of uncertainty. It was not absent 
from the regime of risk, but it was at least contained and accepted (or not, 
as the case may be). In the current climate, uncertainty prevails, and it 
is becoming impossible to make decisions, as the danger cannot be 
clearly evaluated.
Although public opinion developed this grammar of threat to construct 
its relationship to danger, it did so largely despite itself. This situation is 
neither comfortable nor convenient. It places everyone in a state of total 
vulnerability: henceforth unable to be the subject of an action based 
on an accepted evaluation of risk, we see ourselves as the object of a 
threat from which it is often not possible to protect ourselves. Faced with 
these invisible, incalculable dangers, the only way out for anyone whose 
reasoning follows the regime of threat is to apply the precautionary 
principle. In this case, that means not acting, rather than waiting for 
potential consequences which may or may not happen but which—it 
is believed—are dangerous, and if they did come about, would allow no 
going back. 
1.4 FROM RISK TO THREAT: A PARADIGM SHIFT?
The transition from the regime of risk to the regime of threat is not a one-
way street. It is neither universal nor irreversible. It is not as if we had the 
regime of risk on one side, which continues to be applied and explained 
only by institutional actors and experts, and the regime of threat on the 
other, to which public opinion had defected en masse. The two regimes 
coexist, in permanently unstable equilibrium, and their respective 
proportion varies depending on the subject. 
1.4.1 Echoes of other systems of perception
The representations of our relationship to danger echo other systems of 
perception that further reinforce and amplify the danger. The observed 
hostility to innovation or industrial activities resonates with other 
perceived fi elds of vulnerability and insecurity.
Two different but complementary registers of public perception also 
weigh in favor of a relationship to danger structured by the grammar 
of threat.
The first such register stems from the difficulties governments have 
in protecting their populations: for public opinion, these difficulties 
are linked to the hegemony of the world of speculative finance in a 
globalized economy, depriving the State of its traditional powers and its 
protective capability.
This domination of fi nancial logic — already observed as a factor in steering 
public perceptions towards the regime of threat, through a whole series 
of formative crises — is the second register. It nurtures the idea that risk 
prevention will always be trumped by the pursuit of financial interests. 
For public opinion, this situation can logically lead institutional actors and 
experts to behave irresponsibly from the point of view of risk prevention.
1.4.2 Rules of coexistence between risk and threat
The regime of threat generates anxiety, but it also generates 
an inability to act. If it were to spread to every issue that 
comes into the public eye as regards the acceptability 
of activities or innovations, it would cause numerous 
diffi culties. Such diffi culties do exist in many areas, but not 
every topic is exclusively interpreted using the grammar 
of threat: for every subject (GMOs, medications, vaccines, 
fracking, alcohol, tobacco, cellphones, etc.), the grammars 
of threat and of risk will coexist: it is only when the grammar 
of threat wins out that rejection —materialized by falling 
back on the precautionary principle —predominates. When 
the grammar of risk takes precedence, acceptability is no 
longer a core concern.
The fi rst factor that “brings us back” to the regime of risk 
is our capacity for denial: to be constantly aware that we 
are under threat, and that we have no way of avoiding 
danger, is more than we can cope with. Denial allows us 
to disregard danger, to put it in context, to avoid thinking 
about it; an attitude that enables us to live without giving 
in to panic. It operates, for example, in the case of food, 
where we find assertions like “If you start worrying 
about what you’re eating, you may as well stop eating 
altogether”. This attitude allows us to live with danger, 
not by calculating the probability of the risk, but by 
relegating it to the backs of our minds.
The second factor, crucial in steering perceptions 
of danger back towards the regime of risk, lies in the 
perception of the benefi ts (utility or pleasure) associated 
with a given situation or activity. How else can we explain 
the consumption of tobacco, of which the dangers are 
absolutely clear and long established? Cellphones are 
also the subject of debate concerning the health impact 
of microwaves, but the benefits they offer are such that 
their use is not signifi cantly limited by perceptions of the 
risks posed by electromagnetic radiation. The hostility in 
this area is focused on the relay antennas, which crystallize 
neighborhood reactions, reactions that overlook the 
individual and collective benefits of mobile telephony. 
The same type of reasoning is in evidence with vaccines, 
where the perceived individual risks outweigh the collective 
benefi ts which are, almost by defi nition, more abstract.
The balance between risk and threat may also depend 
on cultural attitudes: if we compare Germany and France 
on the topics of nuclear power and waste incineration, 
for example, we find the levels of acceptance and 
hostility refl ected as mirror images.
“THE GRAMMARS OF THREAT AND OF 
RISK WILL COEXIST: IT IS ONLY WHEN 
THE GRAMMAR OF THREAT WINS OUT THAT 
REJECTION — MATERIALIZED BY FALLING 
BACK ON THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE — 
PREDOMINATES. WHEN THE GRAMMAR 
OF RISK TAKES PRECEDENCE, ACCEPTABILITY 
IS NO LONGER A CORE CONCERN .”




1.4.3 “Public opinion is irrational”
Institutional actors and experts often conclude, when 
they fail to win the public over, that public opinion is 
irrational. This assertion does not hold water; public 
opinion is certainly not irrational, and why would it be? 
While certain attitudes may appear irrational, this is 
not because public opinion is “inherently” irrational: 
when the conditions that underpin that vital trust are 
not met, public opinion is deprived of the resources for 
constructing a rational line of conduct.
Under these unfavorable conditions, public opinion 
has developed a new analytical framework, and its 
findings are rarely aligned with what the experts 
would expect. This new grammar of threat, given 
the discomfort it causes, cannot be understood as 
voluntary or as a rational hostility to the regime of 
risk. While it may be instrumentalized by certain 
actors to develop opposition to a particular activity, 
p u b l i c  o p i n i o n  d o e s  n ot  h a v e  a n y  c o n s c i o u s 
voluntar y intention of adopting this new way of 
apprehending danger.
Whenever the divergences between experts and 
public opinion result in an impasse, one must examine 
both lines of reasoning: if the risk model no longer 
holds, then we must consider the threat model. Our 
analytical framework offers a simple explanation 
for recurrent problems: risk-based reasoning and 
argument has no sway over public opinion when the 
latter thinks in terms of threat. If Germans want to be 
understood by the Chinese, they can always exhort 
them to learn German, but it might be more effi cient 
for the Germans to learn Chinese. That is currently 
the alternative facing institutional actors and experts 
if they want to be understood again by a public that no 
longer speaks their language.
2. FACTORS FOR CHANGE
Do divergences between institutional actors/experts and public opinion 
inevitably lead to an impasse? Deadlock is a satisfactory outcome for 
no-one: government agencies and businesses alike are prevented from 
acting and moving forward; public opinion is placed in a state of worry and 
suspicion; and the efforts of the former to persuade the latter often prove 
counterproductive.
Certain parameters need to be examined and worked on, if we are to have 
any hope of resolving these divergences.
The fi rst element to consider is the attitude of young people to danger. 
Perhaps it is in the very nature of the young to develop an attitude to 
danger that differs from the previous generation and to spontaneously 
take a more positive approach to innovation and progress. Whether this 
is the case or not, the study suggests that the generation born after the 
major crises that spawned the climate of doubt—a generation which 
in many cases never knew the era when perceptions of danger were 
generally organized by the regime of risk—developed a different attitude 
to danger-related situations, based on a greater willingness to live with 
uncertainty and the construction of a viewpoint on every situation that 
is accepted as being fragile and likely to change. Young people describe 
the way they assess the danger of a situation in these terms: using all 
available media levers to get a roundup of different viewpoints; consulting 
and sharing opinions with peers; and deciding on a position, which may 
then be tested and challenged by the same process, in response to some 
new event.
The second element relates to the state of distrustfulness in which public 
opinion is immersed, and the conditions it now lays down before any 
institutional or expert voice can be given a hearing. The fi rst condition is 
a question of posture: the speaker must demonstrate his or her capacity 
for empathy with the public, an understanding of people’s experiences, 
viewpoints, and beliefs. Any peremptory posture is doomed to fail from 
the outset. The second condition fl ows from the fi rst, and concerns the 
modes of discussion and argumentation that can be adopted; just as 
peremptory postures are rejected, so also strongly categorical positions 
no longer have credibility. When it comes to risk, there are no longer any 
simple certainties, and it is essential to leave room for doubt: admitting 
that doubt exists generates credibility and thereafter, potentially, 
reassurance.
3. INTERIM CONCLUSION
Once bitten, twice shy… that tends to be the public attitude on topics 
involving questions of danger. Public opinion is war y of exper ts, 
institutions, and truths… It will no longer listen to authoritarian posturing 
or official speechifying. In apprehending danger, it is reluctant to 
believe in the risk models that were found wanting in the past. It takes 
refuge instead in a highly uncomfortable regime of threat, in which the 
pervasiveness of uncertainty prevents it from accepting what it is told by 
institutional actors and experts.
In the construction of danger, grammars of risk and grammars of threat 
now exist side by side. Insisting exclusively on the first as though the 
second did not exist is a recipe for a dialogue of the deaf. It is a dead-
end strategy. The road to change travels through the rebuilding of trust: 
trust can no longer be taken for granted—it has to be developed through 
a complex relationship founded on respect.
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4. PROJECTS IN THE LIGHT OF THIS ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORK
The risk/threat framework can be applied to any type of project: it 
provides a tool for diagnosing or, better, anticipating how public opinion is 
likely to crystallize around a project, and the risks involved.
To this end, the framework must be applied in two distinct phases:
•  Examining the characteristics of the project and of its environment, in 
order to analyze the representations likely to be formed by public opinion;
•  Identifying the sets of actors, already present or liable to intervene, 
and (especially) the logic of the media, due to its infl uence on opinion-
shaping mechanisms.
On the basis of these analyses, project holders can put together their 
communication strategies.
4.1 THE REPRESENTATIONS FORMED BY PUBLIC OPINION 
The consequences of applying the danger/threat model weigh heavily on 
the development of public opinion about a project, particularly as they 
feed into several phenomena that are directly related (the incalculability 
of danger) or indirectly implied (the loss of trust in institutions, the 
suspicion of confl icts of interest). This last sentiment derives particularly 
from the perceived pervasiveness of fi nancial logic, dictating its rules to 
the economy and to political institutions, to the detriment of collective 
concerns (the environment, health, etc.), which are relegated to 
second place.
As a result, public opinion doubts everything: experts, institutions, 
past and current truths… In its approach to many topics, it is reluctant 
to believe in the risk models that were found wanting in the past. In the 
regime of threat, the pervasiveness of uncertainty prevents it from 
accepting what it is told by institutional actors and experts.
This chasm of understanding goes to the heart of many disputes. 
To na r row th e ga p,  we m us t b ui ld n ew re lat io nships b et we e n 
stakeholders, of a kind that will create the conditions for renewed dialogue 
and, potentially, renewed trust.
In a project context, it is crucial to anticipate these divergences: this 
involves analyzing all of the representations that might be associated 
with a project, and measuring to what extent the arguments in favor of 
the project may or may not come into confl ict with these representations.
4.2 THE INFLUENCE OF THE MEDIA
Several sets of actors, around any project, can be infl uential in shaping 
public perceptions, but the media play a determining role.
The workings of the media are a key mechanism in all public opinion 
phenomena, as the media’s status as the central purveyor of information 
makes them key actors in shaping opinion.
Two dif ferent logics, with cumulative consequences, are at work 
here: that of the media’s economic requirements, which construct a 
particular way of handling information, and that of the new era of instant 
communication.
We have already touched on two ways of handling information, specifi c 
to the economic imperatives of broadcasting, which offer fertile ground 
for the construction of opinion. The fi rst is the importance of revelation, 
which takes precedence over the actual facts; the second is the well-
known media adage that good news is no news. This mode of functioning 
— driven by viewer, listener or reader numbers — focuses the media 
spotlight on scares and on alarmist voices, providing 
a potentially constraining negative prism for the 
networks of meaning formed by projects and subjects.
The actual form of the information produced by the 
media also tends to exacerbate the alarmist nature 
of the messages it carries, as the format makes it 
diffi cult to express nuance or complexity. The media 
processing of information tends towards extreme 
simplifi cation.
The era of instant media communication relies on 
technological foundations that enable constant 
availabil i t y of access to any content produced 
anywhere in the world. Media channels are gradually 
converging, to merge all uses together on a single 
terminal, but two different production approaches 
are still  in evidence: that of the media from the 
conventional sphere, which handle continuous fl ows 
of news and information, and that of the decentralized 
production of content via social media. With the 
social networks, and through instantaneity, new 
ways of constructing and sharing information are 
coming into play: a change of nature that also induces 
changes in behavior, particularly in the consumption 
of information.
The development of the instant-media society has 
many consequences that are yet to be seen. For the 
institutional sphere, in the broadest sense, this is a 
source of profound destabilization, particularly as 
regards the disparities between the requirements 
of the long term which largely continues to govern 
the functioning of organizations, and those of the 
short term, which stem from these new modes of 
information consumption.
Upstream of any project, preparatory work must be 
done to avoid the deadlock that results when there is 
too great a discrepancy between the characteristics 
of the project as seen by its promoters and the 
representations that public opinion may have of it. 
The r isk /threat dichotomy of fers an analy tical 
framework for situations where explanations focus on 
a potential danger.
“THE RISK/THREAT FRAMEWORK CAN 
BE APPLIED TO ANY TYPE OF PROJECT: 
IT PROVIDES A TOOL FOR DIAGNOSING 
OR, BETTER, ANTICIPATING 
HOW PUBLIC OPINION IS LIKELY 
TO CRYSTALLIZE AROUND A PROJECT, 
AND THE RISKS INVOLVED.”
Creating the conditions 
for success
49
www.factsreports.org
